Who gets a say over Europe?
Labour went into the 1992 conference divided over a referendum on Europe and came out with a fragile unity.
Like a bag of Revels sealed in red tape, opposition to deeper European integration in 1992 came in an array of tantalizing flavours. Immigration hawks complained that freedom of movement would bring European fascism to British shores. Advocates of monetary sovereignty protested that the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) handed interest rate control over to the Bundesbank. Meanwhile, protectionists agonised over the plight of a British manufacturing sector awash with European imports.
It is unsurprising that European integration has been a thorny issue for both parties and their leadership. Euroscepticism transcends traditional policy silos and, as Britain observed in the runup to 2016 and the fallout of the referendum, can very quickly bind normally opposing factions into a formidable coalition for any party leader.
But, contrary to recent history, and despite loud, competing voices in the party, Labour in 1992 was able to keep the issue from causing a rupture. As the Conservative Party reeled after Black Wednesday, Labour’s unlikely alignment lent added weight to their attacks on the Major government and created a daunting environment for the next phase of the Conservatives’ Europe policy.
Labour could easily have ended up as divided as their opponents
Black Wednesday had shattered public confidence in Conservative economic policy and left the country’s relationship with Europe on uncertain footing. John Smith harangued John Major over Black Wednesday in his Commons debut as Labour leader on September 24, but he faced dissent from his own party over his Europe policy, including from Shadow National Heritage Secretary Bryan Gould. For Labour to present itself as a viable alternative to the Conservatives, it needed to offer a clear path forward for Europe, and that meant getting the party in alignment.
John Smith was a fervent believer in the European experiment, even defying a three-line whip to vote in for joining the European Community in 1971. He had been in favour of the UK joining the ERM (albeit at a lower central rate) and signing on to the Maastricht Treaty—what would become the foundational treaty for the European Union. However, he disagreed with Major and Lamont’s decision to opt out of the treaty’s Social Charter outlining shared social policy objectives and wanted Labour to commit to adopting the chapter during ratification.
But there was a contingent of between 50 and 70 anti-Maastricht MPs led by Peter Shore that were sceptical of deeper European integration. Their opposition had coalesced around calls for a referendum on Maastricht that would give the British public the opportunity to decide its fate.
“Will [the prime minister] please explain how allowing speculators to determine our currency, German banks to determine our interest rates and French voters to determine the future of the Maastricht treaty puts this country at the heart of Europe? Is it not clear that the British, like the Danish, Irish and French, are entitled to determine what is essentially a political matter, although in a debate dressed up as an economic debate?”—Tony Benn, the House of Commons, September 24, 1992
Recent events had bolstered the eurosceptics
To further complicate matters, the eurosceptics in the party had been buoyed by a string of developments in Europe. On June 2, 1992 Denmark voted ‘No’ in its referendum on Maastricht. Black Wednesday had cast doubt over Europe’s ability to solve Britain’s economic problems and undermined the central goal of a monetary union. Then, just four days later on September 20, France delivered a “petit oui” in its own referendum on Maastricht, with the yes vote only securing 51 percent of ballots cast.
“I think we must learn the lesson that the people of Europe have refused to give their wholehearted endorsement to the Maastricht Treaty.”—Bryan Gould, after the French referendum, September 20, 1992
The Maastricht Treaty required ratification from all signatories to take effect. Danish, French, and Irish law required a referendum before the national legislatures could ratify the treaty. Denmark’s ‘no’ vote meant the ratification could not proceed until another referendum had taken place and the necessary ‘yes’ vote secured. At the end of the summer in 1992, with Denmark’s public on the fence, it wasn’t clear the treaty would be revived, further strengthening the hand of the eurosceptics.
“Those bloody Danes—you needn’t quote me—they have really opened a can of worms in the UK.” –John Major in a private conversation with Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, June 11, 1992.
Talk it out…
On September 23, the day before the emergency debate over Black Wednesday in the House of Commons, Labour’s National Executive Committee (NEC) met to coordinate the party’s Europe policy. Smith allowed extensive time to hear all sides of the referendum debate; the committee heard Bryan Gould, Tony Benn, and Dennis Skinner argue the case for a public referendum.
Tony Benn gave a particularly animated plea, but in the end the NEC voted 21-3 against committing the party to a referendum over Europe. In addition to the three senior Eurosceptics that voted for the motion, John Prescott and David Blunkett abstained.
It was felt that a referendum would let the Conservatives off the hook. Divisions over Europe were far wider and more prominent in the Tory Party and a referendum would give them an opportunity to settle a contentious issues and plaster over the cracks.
Major may even have been able to strengthen his support in a referendum campaign. Margaret Thatcher would undoubtedly oppose Maastricht and position campaign against Major’s support for the treaty. Highlighting the political contrast with his unpopular predecessor could have provided a popularity boost by disassociation.
MEP Glyn Ford, leader of the European Parliamentary Labour Party, also expressed fears that the Tory tabloids would use a referendum on Maastricht to elevate “the racists, the nationalists, and the xenophobes”, in a display of exceptional foresight.
At the same meeting, the NEC decided to postpone deliberations on how Labour would handle a Conservative government attempt to steer Maastricht ratification through parliament until Denmark’s issues on ratification had been settled, as Major was not going to broach such a contentious issue until it became clear Denmark wouldn’t scupper the treaty.
…now toe the line
Having given room for debate, Smith considered the matter settled. He insisted Gould accept the party’s view on the matter and expected the Shadow Cabinet to now speak as a collective. John Major had already seized on Labour’s internal debate and was quoted in the media condemning Labour’s divisions—despite the Conservative’s own European chasm dwarfing Labour’s and arguably spawning the whole Brexit movement.
Bryan Gould had already written two articles on Europe, due to be published in the Tribune and New Statesman. Several newspapers reported that Smith accepted this final outburst, but that the Labour leader had made clear to Gould after these two pieces ran, any further public calls for a referendum would be considered a sackable offense.
The new approach was visible at the Labour Party conference in Blackpool the following week. Tony Benn was given just four minutes to speak, which he devoted to reiterating the need for a public referendum on Maastricht. But this time, he was isolated. The motion for a referendum was overwhelmingly rejected and even fellow Eurosceptics like Dennis Skinner and Jeremey Corbyn reportedly urged him to drop the campaign.
Gould’s departure captured conference headlines
On September 29, John Smith committed the party to the devolution of power, the minimum wage, and opting in to Maastricht’s social charter, in a leader’s speech at the conference that devoted a sizeable portion to the importance of European integration.
The headlines after the conference, however, were dominated by Bryan Gould’s resignation. As members flocked to Blackpool for the first day of the conference, Gould announced his front bench departure, immediately laying into the ERM and Maastricht at a fringe meeting of Eurosceptics and stating he could no longer tolerate the “gag and straightjacket” of the cabinet.
He later suggested that the only reason he hadn’t resigned immediately after the NEC vote four days earlier was so as not to distract from Smith’s commons debut as Labour leader the following day.
Other 1992 conference highlights:
Shadow Home Secretary Tony Blair decried the government’s record on law and order, lamenting a country where elderly residents are afraid to go out, yet also unsafe in their own homes.
A decision over the union’s role in future Labour leadership elections was postponed until the following year.
John Smith’s standing ovation was almost derailed because most of the audience hadn’t realised he’d finished his speech. It was only when photojournalists, who had been given copies of the speech in advance, rose and started snapping photos that the audience cottoned on.
Arthur Scargill blasted Tory plans for more coal pit closures (more on this in the coming newsletters).
After decades of often tortuous division over Europe, Labour had come to a place of tenuous harmony. The opportunity to capitalise on an obvious moment of Conservative weakness after Black Wednesday was too enticing to pass up. But Smith’s acuity in giving MPs space to debate the referendum issue undoubtedly helped put the subject to rest.
Gould’s resignation had emboldened Conservative attempts to highlight Labour divisions over Europe and minimize their own, but petty snipes and jabs where a small price to pay. Smith had quietened the left of his party and brought his Shadow Cabinet in alignment, putting the party on the best possible footing to fight the next dogfight over Europe: Maastricht ratification in parliament.
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